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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 2004103 5-CA 
vs. : 
JOHNL.LEGG, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for theft by receiving stolen property, a second 
degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-408 (West Supp. 2005), and arson, 
a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-102 (1 )(b) (West 2004), in the 
Third Judicial District Court, Tooele County, the Honorable Randall Skanchy presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2-3 (2)(e) (West 
2004).' 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to dismiss 
where defendant's 120-day disposition request was prematurely filed? 
1
 Because no changes to code sections relevant to the issues in this case have been 
made since the time the offenses were committed, the State cites to the latest edition of 
me code. 
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"[The appellate court] review[s] a trial court's determination that a defendant's 
charges should be dismissed pursuant to the Speedy Trial Statute for abuse of discretion." 
Statev. Coleman,2001 UT App 281,^3,34 PJd 790, cerf. denied, 42P3d951 (Utah2002). 
"An appellate court will find abuse of discretion only where there is no 'reasonable basis in 
the record to support' the trial court's Speedy Trial Statute determination of 'good cause.'" 
Id. (citations omitted). 
2. Did the trial court violate defendant's right to allocution, to counsel, and to 
presentation of all material information at his sentencing? 
The State confesses error as to the first claim, necessitating a remand for resentencing. 
STATUTES AND RULE 
The following statutes are attached at Addendum A: 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-29-1 - 2 (West 2004); 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 22. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
120-day disposition 
On November 30,2003, defendant was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle and 
arson. Rl. On December 9, 2003, defendant signed a "Notice and Request for Disposition 
of Pending charges" (120-day disposition request), which referred to "arson and auto theft" 
charges, assertedly pending against him in Tooele County. R7. The 120-day notice was 
stamped, "received," on January 5, 2004. Id. The notice also bore a hand-written 
certification that indicated that the 120-day notice had been received on January 8,2004. Id. 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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The same day, the authorized agent who certified receipt of the 120-day disposition request 
mailed it to the Tooele County Attorney's Office. R6. Six days later, on January 14,2004, 
an information charging defendant with theft by receiving stolen property (Count I) and arson 
(Count II) was filed in the Third District Court, Tooele County. R3-2. 
On March 8, a two-day trial was set for May 19 and May 20. R28. On April 26, 
however, that setting was vacated and the trial set to May 6, based on defendant's asserted 
conflict with his counsel, Scott Broadhead, and to ensure that defendant was tried within the 
120-day period (R28-26, 42-41; 271:40-41); 
On May 4,2004, defendant, represented by counsel, moved to dismiss the information 
with prejudice because defendant had not been tried within 120 days of either December 9, 
2003 or January 5, 2004. R52-50. Two days later, on May 6, the trial court heard 
defendant's motion and denied it. R54, 271:26-37. The trial court found that January 8, 
2004 marked the beginning of the 120-day period. R271:35. Based on that date, the court 
concluded that the 120-day period expired on May 10. Id. The court then granted 
defendant's stipulated request to set trial for May 25, and his request to engage a defense 
expert to review the State's arson expert's report. R36-29, 54; 271:36-37. 
On May 24, the May 25 trial setting was vacated and a scheduling hearing set for June 
6, 2004, at which time this Court denied defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal. 
R56. The district court set trial for July 20. R58. 
On July 19, the trial court granted Mr. Broadhead's request to withdraw, appointed 
Wayne Freestone as substitute counsel, struck the July 20 trial setting, and set defendant's 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
new motion to dismiss for hearing at a new pretrial conference. R70-68. 
On August 16, the trial court granted Mr. Freestone's request to withdraw. It then 
appointed L. Douglas Hogan as standby counsel, with which defendant agreed. R93-92; 
271:38-39. 
On August 23, defendant, pro se, with Mr. Hogan acting as standby counsel, renewed 
his motion to dismiss, arguing that the Department of Institutional Operations had improperly 
retained his 120-day notice for 30 days—December 9 to January 8—before processing it, and 
that the 120-day period had expired. Rl 03-100; 271:47,49-53. The prosecutor noted that the 
State would have tried defendant within the 120-day period on May 6, but for defendant's 
repeated requests for continuances—first to locate an expert to counter the State's arson 
expert, then for defendant to prepare after firing his attorneys, and finally because defendant 
suffered physical injuries in a prison altercation. R62; 271:54-55. The trial court again 
denied defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the 120-day disposition period began 
to run from the date the information was filed—January 12, 2004—and expired 120 days 
later—May 29. R271:58. 
Trial was held November 3. Defendant represented himself with standby counsel 
from approximately June 30 through November 3. During that period, defendant sought 
repeated hearings or continuances for a variety of reasons: conflicts with his various counsel 
(R66, 74-71, 83-81, 90-89, 93-92, 107-104, 137-136, 143-142; 271:60, 63-71); challenges 
to denials of his repeated motions to dismiss based on the expiration of the 120-day 
disposition period (R70-68, 93, 103-100, 112-109; 271:40-41, 49-53); injuries incurred in 
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a prison assault (R62); petition for interlocutory appeal (R67, 865 93, 271:41-42); challenge 
to jurisdiction (R74-71; 271:58-60); request to proceed pro se (R88; 271:60); requests for 
transcripts and discovery (R95-93; 115-114; 271:45); and preparation for trial (R151-149, 
153).2 
Trial and judgment 
At trial, defendant continued to represent himself, with Mr. Jon D. Williams acting 
as standby counsel. R143-142; 269:1-262; 271:63-71. A jury convicted defendant on both 
charges. R189. 
Sentencing 
Defendant also represented himself at his sentencing on January 24, 2005, with Mr. 
Williams again acting as standby counsel. R223-222; 271:287. The trial court began by 
asking defendant if there was anything in the presentence investigation report (PSI) that 
needed to be addressed before sentencing. R271:76. Defendant asserted that the PSI 
contained inaccuracies as to his criminal and social history, mitigating circumstances, and 
victim the impact statement. R271:76-78. When defendant engaged in a meandering attack 
on the Utah sentencing scheme, the trial court cut defendant off and again asked defendant 
to specifically identify the inaccuracies in the PSI. R271:79. For the remainder of his 
colloquy with the court, defendant was only able to state that the PSI mistakenly attributed 
40 arrests to him and placed his 1987 business burglary in West Valley instead of Salt Lake 
2
 The substance and chronology of the entire proceedings is set out at Appendix B. 
3
 The facts of the offenses are unnecessary to the disposition of the case. * 
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City. R271:79-84. Frustrated with his inability to articulate himself, defendant had the 
following colloquy with the court: 
Defendant: You won't let me even conduct myself as an attorney. 
The Court: Well, you're not an attorney and I've already advised you that 
you'd be foolish to represent yourself, but you've gone ahead 
and chosen to do that anyway. 
Defendant: Okay, then why don't you appoint counsel and we'll get all 
this straightened out? 
The Court: Because you've chosen to go the other route. 
Defendant: Make up your mind. 
The Court: Make up my mind? Okay. I sentence you on these charges to 
theft by receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, * 
1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. On arson, zero to five 
years at the Utah State Prison. I'll run them consecutive to 
each other. I'll do so based upon the aggravating circumstances 
that your adult record is [legion] and as a result of its being [legion]— 
Defendant: There ain't even a victim. Where's your victim. 
The Court: We're done now because sentencing is over. Please take him 
to the Utah State Prison. 
R271:84-85.4 
The signed minutes of the sentencing hearing and the sentencing order reflect that 
defendant was sentenced to a statutory one-to-fifteen-year term on his conviction for theft 
by receiving stolen property and to a statutory zero-to-five-year term on his conviction for 
arson. R225-222; 271:85. They also show that the sentences were ordered to run 
4
 The transcript of the sentencing is attached at Addendum C. 
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consecutively to one another and to the sentence that defendant was currently serving. R225-
222. 
Consolidation of appellate cases 
On November 22, 2004, after the jury rendered its verdict, but before the court 
sentenced him on January 24,2005, defendant filed a "Notice for a New Trial." R199. On 
November 26, the trial court denied the motion as untimely. R203. Defendant filed a notice 
of appeal on November 28, 2004 from the "final judgment and verdict," and this Court 
assigned an official case number to the appeal—No. 2004103 5-CA. R209-208. After he was 
sentenced, defendant filed another notice of appeal on February 2,2005, now appealing from 
the "order, judgment, and commitment entered on January 24." R230. The Court assigned 
another official case number to the appeal—No. 20050114-CA. R231. The Court 
consolidated both cases under the initial case number. R239. 
Defendant requested appointment of appellate counsel, and following remand by this 
Court, the trial court appointed defendant's current counsel. R255-254. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court properly denied defendant's repeated motions to dismiss the case based 
on the prosecutor's alleged failure to try his case within the time period specified under 
Utah's speedy trial statute. Defendant delivered his 120-day disposition request to prison 
authorities before the information was filed. Consequently, defendant's premature request 
was a legal nullity, having no effect on triggering the 120-day disposition period. 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Defendant's arguments that due process requires that his disposition request be held to have 
"kicked in" on the date the information was filed are unpreserved, unsupported by the record, 
and without merit. 
POINT II 
The State confesses harmful error in that the trial court sentenced defendant before 
it afforded him the opportunity for allocution. The State neither concedes nor resists 
defendant's claim that the prosecutor was not given an opportunity to present information 
material to the imposition of sentence or that the trial court violated his rights by refusing to 
grant defendant's request for counsel at sentencing. The State suggests, however, that since 
the case must be remanded for the trial court to resentence defendant, the prudent course 
would be for this Court to direct that counsel for defendant be appointed for sentencing. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S PREMATURE FILING RENDERED HIS 120-DAY 
DISPOSITION REQUEST A NULLITY, AND HIS ARGUMENTS 
THAT IT SHOULD AUTOMATICALLY "KICK IN" AT THE FILING 
OF THE INFORMATION ARE UNPRESERVED AND MERITLESS 
Defendant claims that "the trial court abused its discretion in finding that good cause 
existed not to dismiss the charges against [him] because [he was not tried] within 120 days 
after receiving notice of [his] written demand as required under UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-
1." Aplt. Br. at 24.5 Recognizing for the first time on appeal that his 120-day notice was filed 
5
 Defendant also claims that his rights were similarly violated under the United 
States and Utah constitutions. Aplt. Br. at 24. He does not, however, apply any federal 
or state constitutional analysis to his claim. Therefore, the State declines to address 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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prematurely; anr •.. .^  ^;u- a nullity, defendant argues that his request should nevertheless 
have ukick[edj in *\\wn me information was ultimately filed because prison authorities 
77-29-2 (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 24-29. The Court should not consider the argument 
because it was never raised in the trial court, and defendant has not argued plain error or 
exceptional circumstances on appeal. In any event, there is no record evidence that prison 
iiulhui'ilies breached am dut) under section 77-24-*!. . ' / . . • 
A. Defendant filed a premature 120-day disposition i c quest. 
Defendant signed his 120-day disposition request on December 9, 2003? referring to 
his arrest for "arson and auto theft/' charges assertedly pending in Tooele County. R7. The 
. ' dispositioi I i eqi lest w as stamped ,6recei\ ed" on January 5, 2004, bi it It also bore a 
hand-written certification that indicated that it had been rece i\ sdon January 8,200 4 h i Six 
days later, on January 14, an information charging defendant with theft by receiving stolen 
property and arson was filed in the Third District Court, Tooele County. R3-2. 
A prematurely-filed 120-day disposition request is a legal nullity. 
Utah's wtspiYth tiiiiT NIUIIIIIC (,tKu known ,r< (he 'Mrl.iiniT" skitntc) pur, ides Ih n 
"[w]henever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in a state prison . . . and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried. . information, and the prisoner shall 
ddh ' erto theci istodial officer in authority, a written demai id specifying the nature of the 
defendant's constitutional claims. See State v. Brandley, 911 r._u s. ;> i u J (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998) (refusing to address claim that counsel's ineffective assistance violated rights 
under article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution where "no independent authority or 
argument" was provided). 
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charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, 
he shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the delivery of the 
written notice." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1(1) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
"Deciding whether the district court properly denied [the defendant's] motion to 
dismiss pursuant to the detainer statute requires a two-step inquiry." State v. Heaton, 958 
P.2d911, 916 (Utah 1998). "First, we must determine when the 120-day period commenced 
and when it expired. Second, if the trial was held outside the 120-day period, we must then 
determine whether 'good cause5 excused the delay." Id. 
In State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, 18 P.3d 504, this Court held that the second 
step of the foregoing inquiry was obviated by the facts of that case. Id, at \ 9. There, this 
Court held that the delivery of a 120-day disposition request to the custodial authority before 
the filing of the information was a nullity in triggering the 120-day disposition period. Id. 
at f 14. The Court noted that the plain language of the statute required that "formal charges 
must be pending against [the defendant] when the request is delivered." Id, at f 10. The 
Court observed that "[a]n action cannot be pending when it is yet to be commenced." Id, at 
f 12 (citing Utah R. Crim. P. 5 (a)). Rule 5, Utah Rules of Criminal procedure states, "all 
criminal prosecutions . . . shall be commenced by the filing of an information . . . ." The 
Utah Supreme Court has explained that "a written signed accusation does not become an 
information until filed with the clerk of the court." State v. Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, ^ 12, 
65 P.3d 1180 (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-1-3(3) (1999)) (emphasis added). Because 
Lindsay delivered his 120-day disposition request before the information was filed, his 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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request was premature, a legal nullity, and therefore "[did not] trigger[] the statutory right 
to demand trial on any i mtried information." Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379. If 14 (quoting 
Stan " i \ Wright. ' 7 1 5 I \2< 14 1 7 150 51 ( [ ) h ih 198'/ )) (bn ickets added), Consequently, this 
Court upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss h / at % 16 See 
Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, ffi[ 1243 (same). 
As in Lindsay and Leatherbury, because defendant's 120-day disposition request was 
fk* .-.*. ,u;a: • . .d thus was of no el feet. ' I his Court shouiu merefore uphold the trial 
t i d/ni.r - • 'cmianf s inolion In duniss Mllion -h Ihi" tmil uuirl did mil dnn ilie 
motion based on defendant's premature filing of his disposition request, "[i]t is well settled 
that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from c'~ "\ '^ ^stainable on any 
legal ground oi theory apparent on the record, even though such ground or theory diners 
f l " * ' ^ * . « : ' * ' I " 111", 
Topanotes, 2003 UT 30, \ 9, 7o I\3d 115KJ ^citation& omuicdj. 
Here, like the defendants in Lindsay and Leatherbury, defendant filed a premature 
120-day disposition request. IMe i-ui . ^ m • nA 4hat defendant filed his 120-day 
dispusilion requesf on human S O^ll-I U V71 •"}*> Ddmdiinl docsnol challenge that finding, 
Aplt. Br. at 32. The information was filed on January 14, 2004. R271:58. Thus, the triiil 
court's undisputed findings show that defendant's request was prematurely filed before the 
information was filed. Based on ihov; h icL"- .* >•- : ' . e foregoing discussion, defendant's 
pren lature reqi lesl was a leg; il ni illity i t.;i:id. tl le trii i 1 coi u t property dei lied his motion to 
dismiss. 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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C. Defendant's due process claim that his premature filing "kicked in" when 
the information was filed is unpreserved, unsupported by any exception to 
the preservation rule or the record, and substantively without merit. 
1. Defendant failed to preserve his argument in the trial court and 
does not argue plain error or exceptional circumstances on appeal 
In Lindsay, this Court stated: "[A] premature request for disposition does not later 
'kick in" once the information is ultimately filed . . . . A premature request is simply a 
nullity, having no legal effect." Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, \ 14. See also Leatherbury, 
2003 UT 2, f 12. For the first time on appeal, defendant recognizes Lindsay and Leather bury 
and that his request was filed prematurely. Aplt. Br. at 26-27. He nevertheless argues that 
due process demands that his disposition request should be held to have "kicked in" on the 
day the information was filed, primarily because the prison authorities breached their duty 
to inform him when the information had actually been filed as required by UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 77-29-2 (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 27. The Court should decline to consider this argument 
because defendant did not preserve it in the trial court and defendant does not argue plain 
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. 
"'Generally speaking, a timely and specific objection must be made [at trial] in order 
to preserve an issue for appeal.'" State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^  14, 543 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 
(quoting State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, \ 45, 114 P.3d 551) (additional citations omitted). 
'" When a party raises an issue on appeal without having properly preserved the issue below, 
' [this Court will] require that the party articulate an appropriate justification for appellate 
re. iew,... specifically, the party must argue either plain error or exceptional circumstance.'" 
Td (quoting Finder, 2005 UT 15, ^ 45) (additional quotations and citations omitted). 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Defendant did not raise his due process claim below. Indeed, he did not even acknowledge 
that ; - i~w-u.i. disposition request was premature and therefore j \ _ * .r'i\ 
Consequently , his due process claim is \ inpreser v ed See Id. 
"[I]n general, appellate courts will not considei an issi ie, inch iding constiti itic nail 
arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or 
the case involves exceptional circumstances." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 13,95 P.3d 276 
(citing State v. • IJU\ _• - . * • • *.;;i ier. a party seeking review of 
a n u n p r e s e r v e d • ' ' • —'- • • ! *rl\ . npunuy 
brief" Finder, 2005 UT i : , '„ ^ (citing Coleman v. Si^vui^ 2U00 Uf 9$, % 9, 17 P.3d 
1122). When a party fails to do so, an appellate c<mr il« refuse to consider the unpreserved 
issue Id. at <[fl} 50', 58 (refusing to considc; nnder's unpreserved claims because he "failed 
to at gue plain • srr :)i: or show exceptional circi n nstances oi l appeal"). 4ccoi i / State " i 
Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271, 272 -73 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (alleged due process viol.r ^ -
statutory term claimed to be insufficiently specific); State v. Scheel, 823 P.2d 470, 473-474 
(I Jtal I Ct ' Vpp. 1991) ("[Unpreserved] Shondel claim presents neither 'plain error' nor 
'exceptioi lal circi in istances' ai id, therefore, w e refi lse to coi isidei it foi the first time on 
appeal") 
Defendant here does not argue that "plain error" or "exceptional circumstance" should 
x. i : ;.n IIK to preserve his due process claim. 1 his Court should therefore decline to 
cunsi, ." ' v.
 (- " :. ; . 2005 i I'l I V"|| b 
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2. Defendant fails to support his section 77-29-2 claim with an adequate record. 
This Court should also decline to consider defendant's claim because he has not 
provided any record to support his primary contention—prison authorities breached their 
statutory duty to inform him of the filing of the information. 
Section 77-29-2 provides: 
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in 
writing of the source and contents of any untried indictments or informations 
against that prisoner concerning which he has knowledge and of that prisoner's 
right to make a request for final disposition thereof. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-2 (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
Defendant argues that his premature disposition notice should be held to have "kicked 
in" when the information was filed on January 14,2004 because prison authorities failed to 
inform him when the information was filed, as required under section 77-29-2. Aplt. Br. at 
27-28. 
This Court should not consider this claim because defendant has not provided this 
Court with an adequate record to review it. Specifically, there is no record evidence that the 
authorities ever knew that the information had been filed on January 14. See State v. Careno, 
2005 UT App 208, \ 19,113 P.3d 1004 (declining to consider claim unsupported by adequate 
record); State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988) ("Inasmuch as defendant has 
failed to provide an adequate record on appeal on this point, this [c]ourt presumes regularity 
in the proceedings below.") 
Alternatively, and contrary to defendant's contention, the record evidence suggests 
that the prison authorities fulfilled their duties under the statute. Defendant acknowledged 
14 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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that the authorities fulfilled their initial duty to inform him of his right to a final disposition 
of any untried information when, as he admitted, the prison authorities gave him a packet 
wlm In tiu hided ilie I .!li-da\ disposition ivquesl as sin m as lie entered I lie prison on December 
3,2003. R271:26. As to prison authorities" second dul ' dt/fnidant ivpeafedh asserts dial 
they did not inform him of the filing of the information on January 14. Aplt. Br. at 28. Ihe 
statute, however, requires that they inform a defendant only of any untried informations of 
w hichthe} haveknc w ledge I her e is no record evidence t..i; u^ authorities ever knew that 
the information had been filed <ai lannaiY ! 1 Indeed, ihen is nmrcnnl e\ ident.e In suppml 
that the authorities did not inform defendant that the information had been filed. In short, 
defendant's claim fails for lack of record evidence. 
Jefendunt has failed to show that his due process arguments have merit 
m spile oi the iuregoinp. fundamental defects in his .iimnnenl, defendant nes cilia, lass 
argues that the trial court, the prosecutor, and his attorneys apparently accepted that his 
premature 120-day notice "kicked in" on the date the information was filed. Therefore, he 
claims that he, legally in iti itored, must be given in, ;-.;u. • : ••; Uie same misunderstanding. 
Aplt. Br. at 28-29. In effect, defendant anaues dial I In • Stale should he estopped fi'oin arguing 
that his claim fails because he filed his request prematurely: "The State cannot come back 
and state Mr. Legg's request for a 120-day disposition is 4null and void5 when the prison did 
- * • . - r - - *• *> •• - -- *-- A p l t h - a t 2 8 . 
That argument mi ' \ - > L « • .
 s 
officials did not follow the statutory requirements. Second, although the pmsei ;. > 
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the burden of showing that it has complied with the 120-day disposition requirement of 
section 77-29-1, that burden only arises after a defendant properly requests the 120-day 
disposition. See Wright, 745 P.2d at 450-51 (the disposition request must be properly 
delivered to proper authorities and contain an appropriate demand to be effective); State v. 
Viles, 702 P.2d 1175,1176 (Utah 1985) ("Section 77-29-1 places the burden on the prisoner 
to give notice to the warden."); Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, f 7, 18 P.3d 504 ^After a 
prisoner appropriately requests speedy resolution of pending charges, the burden shifts to the 
prosecution to commence trial within the 120-day period set out in the statute.") (emphasis 
added). Third, defendant cites no legal authority to support his claim that due process 
requires relief under these facts. Thus, defendant was not relieved of his burden to timely 
file a 120-day disposition request merely because the trial court later, albeit incorrectly, fixed 
the commencement of the 120-day disposition period on the date the information was signed. 
Furthermore, defendant did not bring the matter to the court's attention until May 4, 
three days before the 120-day period was to expire. R52-50. The trial court had already 
moved the trial date back from May 19 to May 6, to accommodate defendant's alleged wish 
to be tried within 120 days from January 8, the day on which he prematurely delivered his 
disposition request. R28-26, 42-41; 271:40-41. The prosecutor was ready to try defendant 
on May 6, the day before the 120-day period would have expired even if it did run from 
January 8. But il was defendant who was not ready to proceed (R62; 271:53-55).6 Thus, it 
6
 At the May 6 hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss, the court granted 
defendant's stipulated request to set trial for May 25, to have a defense expert review the 
State's arson expert's report (R54; 271:36-37). 
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is defendant who should be estopped from taking advantage of the trial court's later error in 
fixing the commencement of the 120-period at January 12. 
Defendant ci it sorll) argues that other aspects of his case require a reversal i mdei • ii le 
p r o c e s s ^ p j t g r a t 29-31. None of these other arguments have merit. Defendant argues 
that Mr. Freestone and Mr. Angerhoffer, prison contract attorneys whom he met with on 
December 15, 2003, told him that they could not provide any services concerning his 120-day 
reqi lest « Ipli. Br at 29 (citii lg R 103). Defendai it presents no i ecord e\ idence of this 
Indeed, the information had not even been filed then. Therefore, defendant has shown no 
duty on the part of these attorneys. 
..». i c\\ J ant impliedly argues that because .u, ^ \ ^ MM; , , \ ;^nk\ . • MIILC ,AC 
-v,-f- , ,i '-'(rn.danfs dispos -; * • ' 
provided b> section 77-29-i. Apii. iii. at 29-30 siting R27i . j j j . ilowever, Wright, 
Lindsay, and Leatherbury implicitly teach that a prosecutor has no duty to inform defendant 
that his notice is premature. The prosecutor only has a duty to bring defendant to trial within 
120 :Ia:> s of a th i: iel> filed 120 da> i lotice, and as extended foi "good cai lse" dela> s 
attributable to defendant. Moreover, even if defendant's arguments under section 77-29-2 
had been preserved, it would not serve him here because the duty imposed by that section is 
on the custom.a. \\\cc:^ noi i;,e prosecutor. See I J I 'AH C O D E A N N. § 7' 7-29-2 ( Vv est 2004). 
Defendant i ixgi les tha t < idji idication of the chz irges in this c -ase within tl le • 1 20 :k ii;;y 
period was made more imperative because a parole hearing, apparently s temming \^w\ 
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another conviction, would be put on hold until the disposition of the instant charges. Aplt. 
Br. at 30 (citing R103). However, the basis of defendant's assertion is again his own self-
serving, unnotarized statement, which does not even mention that a parole board hearing was 
set. R103. Further, defendant cites no legal authority in support of this claim. But more 
important, as stated, the prosecution had no duty to bring defendant to trial within 120 days 
because his disposition request was premature and thus a legal nullity. See Lindsay, 2000 UT 
App 379, % 14, and Leatherbury, 2003 UT 2, ^ 12. 
Defendant argues that the prosecutor unduly delayed filing the information. Aplt. Br. 
at 30 (citing Rl 12-111). He argues that although the fire marshal's report was dated 
December 10,2003 and faxed to the Tooele County Attorney's Office on December 12, the 
prosecutor "sat on" the report until he filed the information on January 14,2004. Id. (citing 
Rl 12-111, 32). This argument fails for lack of record support. Two copies of the fire 
marshal's report, dated December 10,2003, appear in the record. R34-32,124-122. Neither 
copy nor any record the State has located, other than defendant's self-serving, unnotarized 
statement, indicates that the report was faxed to the Tooele County Attorney's Office on 
December 12. Rl 12-111, 34-32, 124-122. But again, Lindsay, expressly rejected this 
argument because the "purpose of the statute is to promote speedy trials, not the speedy filing 
of informations." Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ^ 15. 
In sum, defendant's premature filing of his 120-day disposition request obviated any 
duty the prosecutor had to bring defendant to trial within the time period specified by section 
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77-29-1. 
POIN1 II 
THE STA'I E COINCEDES "liiAl i n E I K I A L COURT'S 
SENTENCING ORDER SHOULD BE REVERSED—THE TRIAL 
DISREGARDED ITS AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO AFFORD 
DEFENDANT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR ALLOCUTION; THE CASE 
SHOULD BE REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING 
Defendant claims that the trial coi trt violated his due process rigni:. a , .• * 
HI indei i ule 22(a), [ Jtali R iiles of Cri i ninal Procedi ire \\ li m. 1 le w as sentenced 1 v ithoi it an 
opportunity for allocution, see Aplt. Br. at Pt. Ill (23), or for the prosecutor to present 
information material to the imposition of his sentence.8 See Aplt. Br. at Pt. II (19-13). I le 
also claims that the trial court violated his right to counsci w hen it sentenced him without 
c< )i msel 1} >lt. Br at I ' it 1 ( 1 3 IS •) ' • \ ' ' - ' 
Despite this conclusion, defendant nevertheless repeats his argument that the 
liu-day period did "kick in" on January 14, 2004, the date the information was filed, 
because the trial court found at the August 23 hearing that that was the date the 120-day 
period began. Aplt. Br. at 31 -33. Defendant here specifically argues that because the 
trial court miscalculated the 120-day period, beginning on January 14, 2004, to have 
ended on May 29, the court failed to make the "good cause" findings required to show 
that trial beyond 120 days was attributable to him. Aplt. Br. at 34-35. As argued above, 
because defendant's prematurely filed disposition request was a legal nullity, any failure 
of the trial court in later miscalculating the expiration of the 120-day disposition period or 
to make adequate "good cause" findings is irrelevant to the resolution of defendant's 
claim. 
8
 Defendant claims violations of his due process rights under both the United 
States and Utah constitutions and rule 22(a) to support Points II and III. Aplt. Br. at 19, 
23. However, because "[n]o argument has been made as to why . , . under the Utah 
[Rules of Criminal Procedure], the result would be different under wither the Utah or the 
federal constitution, we will therefore treat the contention as a single argument rather than 
as three separate arguments." State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, f 11 n.2, 31 P.3d 615 
(citation omitted), affd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. 
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Rule 22, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides: 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation 
of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). 
"A defendant's personal exercise of the rights granted in rule 22(a) is referred to as 
allocution." State v. Wanosik, 2001 UT App 241, | 29, 31 P.3d 615 (citations omitted) 
(emphasis in original), affd, 2003 UT 46, 79 P.3d 937. "Rule 22(a) codifies the common-
law right of allocution, allowing a defendant to make a statement in mitigation or explanation 
after conviction but before sentencing." Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, % 18 (citation omitted). The 
State concedes that the trial court did not allow defendant to personally exercise his right to 
allocution.9 Under Wanosik, this was reversible error. See Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, f 18. The 
case should therefore be remanded for a new sentencing hearing at which defendant may 
allocute. 
Because the State agrees that defendant should be given a new sentencing hearing on 
the allocution claim, this Court need not address defendant's other claims. However, because 
the case should be remanded for resentencing, any error in failing to grant defendant's 
9
 Notwithstanding its concession, the State recognizes that the trial court's action 
was understandably provoked. At sentencing, defendant generally insisted on directing 
the proceeding as he thought appropriate, rather than responding to the court's reasonable 
and explicit instructions. R271:76-85. At one point, defendant simply disregarded the 
court's refusal to hear defendant's unrelated legal arguments, said, "Oh, shit," and carried 
on as before. R271:79. Defendant's request for counsel was downright impertinent and 
offensive. R271:84-85. Nevertheless, the affirmative requirement to afford a defendant 
an opportunity to allocute is clear. See Wanosik, 2003 UT 46, f^ 18. 
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request for counsel can be readily cured on remand. Indeed, it would be appropriate for this 
Court to direct the trial court to appoint counsel if it finds that defendant is indigent. The 
State assumes that defendant would not now oppose such appointment given his request at 
sentencing and his claim of error on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J_ day of March, 2006. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (West 2004) 
§ 77-29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge-Duties of custodial 
officer-Continuance may be granted-Dismissal of charge for failure to bring to trial 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state prison, jail or other penal or 
correctional institution of this state, and there is pending against the prisoner in this state any untried 
indictment or information, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer 
in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying the nature of the 
charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he shall 
be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written 
notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand described in Subsection (1), 
shall immediately cause the demand to be forwarded by personal delivery or certified mail, return 
receipt requested, to the appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, provide the attorney with 
such information concerning the term of commitment of the demanding prisoner as shall be 
requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the prosecuting attorney or the 
defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being 
present, may be granted any reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such continuance as has 
been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the 
proceeding. If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
within the time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for continuance 
was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with prejudice. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, §2. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-2 (West 2004) 
§ 77-29-2. Duty of custodial officer to inform prisoner of untried indictments or informations 
The warden, sheriff or custodial officer shall promptly inform a prisoner in writing of the source and 
contents of any untried indictments or informations against that prisoner concerning which he has 
knowledge and of that prisoner's right to make a request for final disposition thereof. 
Laws 1980, c. 15, §2. 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 22 
RULE 22. SENTENCE, JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall set a time for 
imposing sentence which shall be not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, 
unless the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement 
and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to present any 
information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may 
likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a warrant 
for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall impose sentence and shall 
enter a judgment of conviction which shall include the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. 
Following imposition of sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of defendant's right to appeal 
and the time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its commitment setting forth the 
sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the 
commitment to the jail or prison and shall make the officer's return on the commitment and file it 
with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an illegal manner, at any time. 
(f) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty and mentally ill, the court shall impose sentence in accordance 
with Title 77, Chapter 16a, Utah Code. If the court retains jurisdiction over a mentally ill offender 
committed to the Department of Human Services as provided by Utah Code Ann. § 
77-16a-202(l)(b), the court shall so specify in the sentencing order. 
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Chronology of proceedings in prosecution of defendant John L. Legg: 
November 30, 2003 - defendant was arrested for possession of a stolen vehicle and 
arson (Rl). 
December 9 - defendant signed a "Notice and Request for Disposition of Pending 
charges" (120-day disposition request), which referred to "arson and auto theft" charges 
pending against him in Tooele County, brought by "the Utah Highway Patrol" (R7); 
January 5, 2004 - the 120-day notice was stamped, "received" (R7); 
January 8 - the authorized agent who certified receipt of the 120-day notice mailed it 
to the Tooele County Attorney's Office (R.6). 
January 14 - an information charging defendant with theft by receiving stolen property 
(Count I) and arson (Count II) was docketed (R3-2); 
March 8 - a two-day trial is set for May 19 and May 20 (R28); 
April 26 - based on defendant's asserted conflict with Mr. Broadhead, trial, formerly 
set for May 19, was moved forward to May 6 to ensure that defendant was tried within the 
120-day period (R28-26, 42-41; 271:39-41); 
May 4 - defendant, represented by Scott A. Broadhead, moved to dismiss the 
information with prejudice because defendant had not been tried withing 120 days from 
either December 9, 2003 or January 5, 2004 (R52-50); 
May 6 - the trial court heard defendant's motion to dismiss and denied it (R54, 
271:26-37); the trial court found that January 8, 2004 marked the beginning of the 120-day 
period because that was the date that was "officially noted as being sworn to by the officer" 
at the Division of Institutional Operations (R271:35); based on that date, the court concluded 
that the 120-day period expired on May 10, 2004 (id.); the court also found good cause to 
extend the 120-day period because defendant repeatedly had not objected to the setting of 
trial dates outside the 120-day period (R271:33-36); the court then granted defendant's 
stipulated request to set trial for May 25, to have a defense expert review the State's arson 
expert's report, which the prosecutor had sent to defense counsel on April 8 (R36-29, 54; 
271:36-37); 
May 24 - the May 25 trial setting was vacated and a scheduling hearing was set for 
June 6, 2004 (R56); 
June 6 - the trial court denied defendant's request for an interlocutory appeal, and trial 
was set for July 20 (R58); 
June 30 - defendant informed the court that he had been hospitalized for injuries 
suffered in a recent prison assault and requested an extension until mid-August to prepare 
his defense (R62); 
July 8 - defendant filed a motion in which he claimed that his counsel, Mr. Broadhead, 
had consented to continuances without defendant's consent and in which defendant requested 
that the trial court appoint new counsel (R66); 
July 15 - defendant notified the clerk of the district court to reschedule the trial, set 
for July 19 [sic] because he had filed a petition for interlocutory review in the court of 
appeals on July 12 (R67, 86); this Court returned the petition to defendant because the 
petition was not addressed properly (R86); this Court denied defendant's refiled petition 
because it was untimely (R86); Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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On July 19 - defendant filed a motion to dismiss in which he alleged not only the 
prosecutor's failure to timely bring him to trial under Utah Code Ann. 77-29-1, but also that 
Mr. Broadhead had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in failing to file defendant's 
motions and that the court lacked jurisdiction of the theft-by-receiving charge because the 
incident occurred in Salt Lake County (R74-71); the trial court granted Mr. Broadhead's 
request to withdraw, appointed substitute counsel, Wayne Freestone, struck the July 20 trial 
setting, and set defendant's motion to dismiss for hearing at a new pretrial conference on 
August 2 (R70-68); 
July 22 - defendant filed a motion for "statu[t]es review" in which he claimed that his 
newly appointed attorney, Wayne Freestone, had a conflict of interest with him and in which 
he requested the trial court not appoint Mr. Freestone as his counsel (R83-81); 
July 28 - defendant, without reference to a specific purpose or date, moved to extend 
the proceedings to allow him to proceed pro se in the preparation of his defense until new 
counsel could be appointed (R88-85); 
August 2 - because of a scheduling conflict, Mr. Freestone did not appear for the 
hearing; defendant, pro se, argued that Mr. Freestone had a conflict; the trial court continued 
the hearing to August 16, at which time the court would hear defendant's pro se motions 
(R90-89); 
August 16 - the trial court granted Mr. Freestone's request to withdraw and appointed 
L. Douglas Hogan as standby counsel, with which defendant agreed (R93-92; 271:38-39); 
defendant argued his own motion for extension of time for filing his petition for interlocutory 
appeal (R93; 271:41-42)10; defendant, pro se, also again moved to dismiss the case based on 
the expiration of the 120-day disposition period (R93; 271:40-41); the court had not reviewed 
the motion, believing that it had already reviewed it on May 6, and continued that matter to 
August 23 (R271:45-46); defendant also filed a motion for transcripts in contemplation of 
proceeding pro se at trial (R95-93; 271:45); 
August 23 - defendant again represented himself; Mr. Hogan acted as standby counsel 
(R271:47); defendant again argued that the Department of Institutional Operations had 
improperly retained his 120-day notice for 30 days—December 9 to January 8—before 
processing it, and that the 120-day period had expired (R103-100; 271:49-53); the prosecutor 
noted that the State would have tried defendant within the 120-day period on May 6, but for 
defendant's repeated requests for continuances—first to locate an expert to counter the 
State's arson expert, then for defendant to prepare after firing his attorneys, and finally 
because defendant suffered physical injuries in aprison altercation (R62; 271:53-55); the trial 
court again denied defendant's motion to dismiss, concluding that the 120-day disposition 
period began to run from the date the information was filed—January 12,2004—and expired 
120 days later—May 29 (R271:58); the court found that "extension has been granted as a 
result of requests by counsel and they're reasonable" (id)\ the court also denied defendant's 
10
 Defendant was mistakenly before the trial court on August 16 on his pro se 
motion to extend the time for filing his pro se petition for interlocutory appeal, which the 
court of appeals had apparently denied as untimely. R271:41-42, 53. The trial court 
explained to defendant that it lacked the power to rule on a matter that lay entirely within 
this Court's jurisdiction. R271:42. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pro se motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the theft-by-receiving incident 
occurred in Tooele County (R271:58-60); the trial court then sought to set the case for trial 
(R271:60); Mr. Hogan stated that he was ready to proceed immediately, but that defendant 
wanted to represent himself (id.); defendant stated that Mr. Hogan had a conflict because he 
was representing "the victim of one of my crimes, an assault on an inmate within this Tooele 
County Jail" (id.); the trial court stated that it would not hear defendant's oral motion to 
disqualify his counsel because it was not then properly before the court (id.); defendant 
agreed to file a written motion (id.); the court set trial for October 26 (R271:61); the court 
set September 20 to hear any motions, directing defendant to file his prospective motion to 
disqualify his counsel as soon as possible and indicating that standby counsel needed to be 
located to help represent defendant at trial, all of which defendant also agreed with (id.); 
August 26 - the trial court granted Mr. Hogan5s motion to withdraw (R107-104); 
September 1 - defendant moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the prosecutor 
had misrepresented that the filing of the information had been delayed by the extended time 
necessary for the fire marshal to prepare his report and for the prosecutor to review it (Rl 12-
109); 
September 5 - defendant moved for a bill of particulars, alleging that Mr. Hogan had 
ineffectively failed to request one to prepare a defense (Rl 15-114); 
September 30 - the prosecutor prepared and filed a lengthy and detailed bill of 
particulars, with exhibits, which he hand-delivered to defendant two working days later 
(R135-116); 
October 4 (pretrial conference) - possible conflicts counsel—Mrss. Broadhead, 
Freestone, and Hogan all have conflicts with defendant; trial court appoints Jon Williams as 
conflicts counsel and continues matter until October 18 for another pretrial conference; court 
denied defendant's renewed motion to dismiss of August 28 (R137-136); 
October 18 - Mr. Williams entered his appearance as defendant's standby counsel, 
with whose appointment defendant agreed; following Frampton colloquy, the court allowed 
defendant to represent himself; defendant requested additional time to prepare himself for 
trial; jury trial was rescheduled to November 3, 2004 (R143-142; 271:63-71); 
October 28 - Defendant, pro se, moved to continue the trial setting to allow him time 
to review the report of State's expert witness, to learn "the rules and procedures" required 
to cross-examine that witness, and to call his own expert witness (Rl 51-149); 
November 1 - the court denies defendant's motion to continue the trial (R153); 
November 3 -jury trial (R158-156; 269:1-289). 
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1 APPEARANCES 
2 For the Plaintiff: GARY K. SEARLE 
3 For the Defendant: PRO SE 
A -k •*• "k 
5 TOOELE, UTAH - JANUARY 24, 2005 
6 JUDGE RANDALL N. SKANCHY PRESIDING 
7 P R O C E E D I N G S 
8 THE COURT: We're here in the matter of State of Utah 
9 v. John Legg. It's Cases 0413000055 and 041300016. 
10 Mr. Legg, we were here last time for sentencing, you 
11 hadn't had an opportunity to review the pre-sentence report so 
12 we postponed it so that you might have an opportunity to do 
13 that. I should note for the record that Mr. Legg has chosen to 
14 represent himself, did so at the time of trial and is now 
15 representing himself here at the time of sentencing. Have you 
16 had an opportunity Mr. Legg now to review the pre-sentence 
17 report? 
18 MR. LEGG: Yes, I have. 
19 THE COURT: Is there anything in the pre-sentence 
20 report that is factually incorrect that needs to be addressed 
21 here before I hear your arguments about sentencing? 
22 MR. LEGG: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Go ahead then and tell me what that would 
24 be. 
25 J MR. LEGG: I have to, I prepared, wrote it down. 
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1 Comes now I, the Defendant and attorney pro se, hereby objects 
2 to the pre-sentence report prepared in this case for the 
3 inaccuracies of the criminal history and the lack of mitigating 
4 factors and the victim impact statement along with the 
5 defendant's social background and accomplishments while on 
6 parole for his first time after being released from prison and 
7 that due to the fact the pre-sentence report are supplemental, 
8 the defendant has been prejudiced from such inaccuracies since 
9 1988 when he was sentenced to prison for his first time and 
10 that due to such inaccuracies the defendant has never been 
11 granted a parole until this past release in which the defendant 
12 becomes subject again to an indeterminate sentence that's 
13 devised here in the state of Utah and which is becoming a 
14 widely known topic and a discussion whether or not such system 
15 is constitutional or not and should become a close scrutiny 
16 with the latest U.S. Supreme Court ruling in Blakeley v. 
17 Washington for such case involves the inaccurate pre-sentence 
18 report conducted by the parole and probation officers to the 
19 courts and the defendants are becoming subject to a minimum 
20 mandatory sentence that are being handed down and was of a 
21 highly well publicized case right here in Utah in September 
22 2004 with Weldon Angelos receiving a 55 year sentence on his 
23 first time offense, possession of marijuana with the intent to 
24 distribute. And in this case, the defendant faces up to 15 to 
25 J 20 years maximum depending on the sentences that are to run, if 
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1 they are to run concurrent or consecutive and/or a decision 
2 handed down by the Utah Board of Pardons for in Utah once the 
3 sentence or commitment is ordered by the trial court, once 
4 imposed and the information relied on becomes subject to the 
5 Board of Pardons and Parole in which vest almost complete 
6 discretion to them to determine the actual time served, (see 
7 State v. Schroeder). 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Legg, what I need you to do at this 
9 time is— 
10 MR. LEGG: I'm getting there. 
11 THE COURT: —if there's some inaccuracies in the pre-
12 sentence report and those are what we need to focus on. 
13 MR. LEGG: I'm working up to that. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I don't want you to work up to it. 
15 I want you to go to it now because I don't have time to— 
16 MR. LEGG: I've already told you that I don't-
17 THE COURT: Just a minute, Mr. Legg. I don't have 
18 time for your discourse about federal minimum mandatory 
19 sentencing which is not applicable here. 
20 MR. LEGG: This is 15 to 20 years that we're talking 
21 about. I don't have an attorney. 
22 THE COURT: And that's your own choice. We went 
23 through this process. 
24 MR. LEGG: You cannot allow me five to ten minutes? 
25 I THE COURT: I'll allow you as much time as you want 
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1 in the context of what we do for sentencing and at sentencing, 
2 I ask you, is there anything in this report that's inaccurate. 
3 If so, please tell me what that is. 
4 MR. LEGG: It's my criminal background history. 
5 THE COURT: Okay, well then-
6 MR. LEGG: The victim impact statement that I've 
7 already spoke on. 
8 THE COURT: Then address that please. 
9 MR. LEGG: Oh, shit. 
10 THE COURT: I mean, I only have a certain amount of 
11 time. 
12 MR. LEGG: And that the Utah Department of 
13 Corrections shall employ the necessary staff for providing 
14 investigations for conducting and preparing a pre-sentence 
15 report to assist the courts and the Utah Board of Pardons in 
16 its decision making responsibilities as described within Utah 
17 Code Annotated 64-13-20 and the Utah Code-
18 THE COURT: Are there, Mr. Legg, any inaccuracies-
19 MR. LEGG: There's no victim impact statements. 
20 THE COURT: Are there any inaccuracies in this 
21 document you want to address? 
22 MR. LEGG: Yes. 
23 THE COURT: Well, then please address those. 
24 MR. LEGG: I'm telling you, there's no victim impact 
25 statement which is mandatory language under 64-13-20 and 
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1 76-3-404. The social background is incorrect. 
2 THE COURT: Tell me how it's-
3 MR. LEGG: The history incorrect. 
4 THE COURT: Don't speak generally, speak 
5 specifically. What is, in terms of the criminal background, 
6 your record, incorrect? 
7 MR. LEGG: I have my rap sheet. It says-
8 THE WITNESS: I want you to walk me through it so 
9 that I may make corrections. 
10 MR. LEGG: In 1988 I was convicted. I pled guilty to 
11 a crime. It was a zero to five. I spent five years 
12 incarcerated. I did the whole term. I was out for two years. 
13 THE COURT: Which one is that on this adult record? 
14 You say x88 and I see that there are two. 
15 MR. LEGG: That would have been in front of Judge 
16 Young that used to work here at this courtroom. He was 
17 relieved of his duties. 
18 THE COURT: I don't see that. When I'm looking at 
19 your adult record it shows January 17 of 1988 that you were 
20 charged with being a fugitive from justice but that was 
21 dismissed and then in September of x88 in West Valley City you 
22 were there on a bench warrant probation violation for a theft 
23 which you ended up serving a year at the Utah State Prison. Is 
24 I that the one you're referring to? You were also on a warrant 
for burglary theft which was zero to five years a the Utah 
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State Prison. 
2 MR. LEGG: I have it all right here, Your Honor. 
3 If you'd like to show this to the Judge right here, 
4 1988. Right there, was sentenced to prison. 
5 That's my last pre-sentence report. 
6 THE COURT: Okay. 
7 MR. LEGG: Which is more accurate than this one that 
8 was prepared for this case. 
9 THE COURT: And those again, I'm looking at this pre-
10 sentence report and this one and they reflect the same thing. 
11 What you've shown me is on September 1st of 1988 you went back 
12 to prison because of violations of your probation. Okay. Now, 
13 tell me what is inaccurate about your record so that we can 
14 resolve any differences, if there are any. 
15 MR. LEGG: Read that front page right there and once 
16 you read that, I'll be able to— 
17 THE COURT: We're not here to discuss the law. 
18 MR. LEGG: No, that's not the law. That's my pre-
19 sentence report. 
20 THE COURT: I've got your pre-sentence report right 
21 here. 
22 MR. LEGG: I says that I've been arrested for 40 
23 times. I've only been on the streets for the five years of the 
24 last 17 years. There is no possible way that I was arrested 40 
25 times, okay? 
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1 THE COURT: That's something I can deal with and 
2 I'11-
3 MR. LEGG: I wasn't even alive in 1954 to commit 
4 larceny, okay? And that's part of the— 
5 THE COURT: Again Mr. Legg, I'm looking at a pre-
6 sentence report that has your adult record starting in 1987. 
7 MR. LEGG: Right. In 1987-
8 THE COURT: So why do I have to hear about 1957? 
9 MR. LEGG: 1988 if you would have just took a time 
10 out and reviewed the documentation that I have here, in 198 8, 
11 since the pre-sentence report are supplemental as I was 
12 stating, right? 
13 - - THE COURT:- Uh-huh (affirmative). 
14 MR. LEGG: In 1988 they used my dad's - I am a junior 
15 - they used by dad's criminal background to sentence me and 
16 since I didn't object in 1988 to the pre-sentence report, such 
17 has been supplemental to that and I'm still being punished for 
18 it today. You follow what I'm saying? There is impossible 40 
19 arrests. There's— 
20 THE COURT: I follow what you're saying, Mr. Legg, 
21 but this of course doesn't reflect a supplemental pre-sentence 
22 report. 
23 MR. LEGG: If you-
24 THE COURT: This is a pre-sentence report prepared 
25 I by-
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1 MR. LEGG: It's inaccurate. 
2 THE COURT: -the state of Utah and I'm asking you to 
3 simply tell me what the inaccuracies are. That's what we do 
4 here. 
5 MR. LEGG: My criminal background, the victim impact. 
6 It does not contain a victim impact. 
7 THE COURT: I've got the victim impact argument. 
8 I've heard that. Now, what's inaccurate with your criminal 
9 history? 
LO MR. LEGG: There are charges that are in there that 
LI will -
12 THE COURT: Which charges then-
L3 MR. LEGG: I haven't been able to obtain them records 
L4 yet because I'm being refused through the Department of 
L5 Corrections to give me access to the records that pertain to me 
16 Title 63 - what, 3-202 or something like that. I can't 
17 remember the exact title on that. 
18 THE COURT: Let's go through these. They start in 
19 1987 in West Valley. You were convicted of a business burglary 
20 and served five years at the Utah State Prison. Is that an 
21 accurate one? 
22 MR. LEGG: That's inaccurate. 
23 THE COURT: So you weren't charged in West Valley 
24 City Police Department? 
25 MR. LEGG: No I was not, it was in Salt Lake County. 
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THE COURT: So that's the inaccuracy? 
MR. LEGG: That's one of them. 
THE COURT: So I will make that change. Instead of 
West Valley, I'll put Salt Lake Police Department but you did 
serve based upon a charge of business burglary, five years at 
the Utah State Prison, that was your sentence? 
MR. LEGG: And I served the whole five years. 
THE COURT: Good. 
MR. LEGG: That's the point I'm trying to get to. 
The information that is being supplied to the Board of Pardons 
since you do not hand down the actual time served, okay, and 
you commit me to the Board of Pardons, the inaccuracies, if 
they're not corrected will allow me to be sentenced to 20 
years. If you run the sentences concurrent, it'll be 15 years. 
I will be given a maximum sentence, do you understand, because 
of these inaccuracies. They have painted me and portrayed me 
as a violent criminal and I do not have any violence on my 
record. 
THE COURT: I don't know about that except to-
MR. LEGG: Misdemeanor assault. 
THE COURT: —say that your presentation today only 
underscores the fact that you are — 
MR. LEGG: You won't let me even conduct myself as an 
attorney. 
THE COURT: Well, you're not an attorney and I've 
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1 already advised you that you'd be foolish to represent yourself 
2 but you've gone ahead and chosen to do that anyway. 
3 MR. LEGG: Okay, then why don't you appoint counsel 
4 and werll get all this straightened out? 
5 THE COURT: Because you've chosen to go the other 
6 route. 
7 MR. LEGG: Make up you mind. 
8 THE COURT: Make up my mind? Okay. I sentence you 
9 on these charges to theft by receiving stolen property, a 
10 second degree felony, 1 to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. 
11 On Arson, zero to five years at the Utah State Prison. I'll 
12 run them consecutive to each other. I'll do so based upon the 
13 aggravating circumstances that your adult record is~ legend and 
14 as a result of it being legend— 
15 MR. LEGG: There ain't even a victim. Where's your 
16 victim. 
17 THE COURT: We're now done because sentencing is 
18 over. Please take him to the Utah State Prison. 
19 What do we need to do with the other case, revoke his 
20 probation and have it... 
21 MR. LEGG: You don't need to bend my thumb. 
22 THE COURT: This by the way is Mr. Legg's. If we can 
23 give than to him so that he can have it. 
24 MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, if you'll call this case, 
25 we'll dismiss it. (inaudible). 
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THE COURT: It's called and dismissed. 
MR. CUNDICK: State v. Legg, the one ending in 055, 
If you call that the State would move to dismiss. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
-c-
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